time is the most important element of a succesful insurgent campaign as it can make up for other weaknesses


its a strategic studies.. Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (London: Chatto and Windus). (Skim Chapter 1 for background, Chapters 4 & 8) Andrew Mack, Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict in Thomas G. Mahnken & Joseph A. Maiolo (eds) Strategic Studies: A Reader (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 308-325. John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (CT: Praeger, 2002). (Chapters 4 & 8) Key Conceptual Reading James Kiras, Irregular Warfare in David Jordan, James D. Kiras, David J. Londsdale, Ian Speller, Christopher Tuck and L. Dale Walton (eds), Understanding Modern Warfare. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 301-368. Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1961). Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical & Critical Study, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1998) 237-325. Additional Reading Thomas R. Mockaitis, “The Origins of British Counter-Insurgency”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Dec. 1990), pp. 209-25. Karl Hack, “The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 32(3), 2009, pp. 383-414. Kumar Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds, 1948-1958 (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2002). Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare From Ancient Times to the Present, New York: W.W Norton, 2013, pp. 378-413. Robert Taber, The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice (London: Paladin, 1970). Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping, (London: Faber, 1991). David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, (CT: Praeger, 2009).